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Foreword: Equal Employment Law and the
Continuing Need for Self-Help
DERRICK A. BELL, JR.*
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, during its first dozen years,
has spawned more discrimination cases than all the other areas of
civil rights combined. Innovative and persistent advocacy has produced a surprising number of supportive judicial precedents, and
not an insignificant number of job opportunities for those in the
classes protected by its provisions. But the character and scope of
these successes raise serious doubt as to the long-term effectiveness
and worth of equal employment laws.
Pessimism seems out of place given the widespread agreement
that employment decisions should not be based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Indeed, it is difficult to find serious
disagreement with the frequently-quoted Fifth Circuit conclusion
that job bias is "one of the most deplorable forms of discrimination
known to our society, for it deals not with just an individual's sharing in the 'outer benefits' of being an American citizen, but rather
the ability to provide decently for one's family in a job or profession
for which he [or she] qualifies and chooses."'
But if the country was really committed to eradicating the social
and economic burdens borne by the victims of employment discrimination, it would have fashioned a far more efficacious means
of accomplishing this result. At present, the law channels charges
of employment discrimination into a burdensome, conciliationoriented, administrative structure that functions, in the main, on a
case-by-case basis, depending on effectively-prosecuted litigation
and a sympathetic judiciary for even the hard-won progress thus far
achieved. Even the most wildly optimistic among us cannot reasonably hope that reliance on this complex and uncertain process will
close the wide gap in income standards and unemployment rates
between black and white and male and female employees. For these
are the statistical reminders that job discrimination and its effects
have diminished little over the last decade.
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B., Duquesne University, 1952; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1957.
1. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted with
approval in Roe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972), and Huff v. N.D.
Tass Co. of Ala., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973).
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In analyzing the society's choice of so obviously an inadequate
means of remedying perhaps its most serious racial problem, Professor Owen Fiss has written that equal employment laws are a limited
strategy for conferring benefits on a racial class. In his view, "the
limited nature of this legal strategy is not just a function of the
circumstances of politics but rather reflects a deep commitment to
the values of economic efficiency and individual fairness." 2 For Fiss,
the most troublesome question is whether the historical legacy of the
class will, or should, moderate that commitment so as to yield
through enactment or construction, a more robust strategy for law.
Fiss believes the legacy supplies an ethical basis for the desire to
improve the relative economic position of blacks, and yet, he fears
it also explains why "a law that does no more than prohibit discrimination on the basis of race will leave that desire, in large part,
3
unfulfilled."1
In attempting to assess the hundreds of new equal employment
decisions that pour from the courts in a steady stream, it is easy to
become so involved in the technical complexities increasingly marking litigation in this field that the structural compromises recognized by Professor Fiss are not given the importance they deserve.
As a result, there is a tendency to equate activity in the field with
progress when, in fact, much of the litigation even when successful,
has real significance for very few workers. Careful scrutiny of even
favorable decisions reveal conditions and restrictions on relief that
limit the holding to overt instances of discrimination seldom resorted to by contemporary employers. The protection provided by
such precedents in more difficult issues is tenuous and undependable.
To cite a few examples, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
very tight review of employment tests mandated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' was intended more for blue
collar positions than for those in the higher echelons of the work
force. The futile attempt by civil rights lawyers representing minority law graduates to convince courts to apply the Griggs standard
to bar examinations is all too clear a signal of judicial reluctance to
require meaningful validation of tests used for positions of significance.' And, after the confusing but clearly unsupportive language
2. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 313 (1971).
3. Id. at 314.
4. 401 U.S. at 424 (1971).
5. The decisions, all of which found that Title VII was not intended to apply to bar
examinations, are cited and summarized in Woodard v. Va. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F.
Supp. 211, 213-14 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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in Washington v. Davis,' there is understandable concern that
Griggs' "strict scrutiny" of invalidated tests that disproportionately
bar minorities and women may have been eroded to an irreparable
degree.
As another example, the seniority issue seemed to be settled until
the recent recession produced a spurt of litigation generally referred
to as the "layoff" cases. 7 Most courts had followed Judge John
Minor Wisdom's thoughtful analysis,8 and ruled that nothing in
Title VII prevented setting aside departmental seniority rules in
firms where minority employees had been excluded because of discrimination from gaining seniority in all-white departments. When
openings became available in such departments, Judge Wisdom
found minority workers with greater plant seniority entitled to those
openings over whites whose frustrated expectations were based
solely on their departmental seniority.
In effect, Judge Wisdom, and those courts which adopted his
"rightful place" approach, were granting minority workers "fictional" departmental seniority measured by their plant seniority.
But when the economic downturn converted openings into layoffs,
courts proved unwilling to disappoint white workers' expectations
that discharge would be handled on a "last-hired, first-fired"
basis. Even when they decimated the minority work force, courts
found that the disproportionate impact on recently hired minorities
caused by discharging workers under reverse seniority layoff policies
did not violate Title VII. Nor, courts have agreed, may racial balance in the work force be maintained through quota layoffs. The
Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in a case not involving layoffs,9
that victims of job discrimination may be entitled to "fictional" or
''constructive" seniority dating to the time they can prove they
sought a job or transfer which was refused for reasons violating Title
VII. But relatively few workers will be able to supply the necessary
proof, and thus the law, as presently interpreted, leaves minority
workers without protection against the adverse effects of past discrimination at just those points in the economic cycle when they
most need help.
As a final example, there are indications that the Supreme Court
6. 424 U.S. 940 (1976).
7. Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976); Watkins v. United Steel
Workers, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey Cen. Power & Light Co. v. IBEW,
508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wis. Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
8. Local 189, United Paper Makers & Paper Workers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969).
9. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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is losing its earlier sensitivity to the special scrutiny appropriate
when minorities complained of discrimination by labor unions.'"
The Court's willingness" to recognize Title VII as a separate remedy
available even to those workers who have taken their discrimination
charges to a grievance procedure authorized by a collective bargaining agreement is praiseworthy, but either approach requires long
months (and often years) of litigation, and neither remedy is likely
to be as quick and effective as protests and other direct action
techniques intended both to end biased practices, and gain affirmative programs of minority hiring and upgrading that are often opposed by both company and union.
Presented with this conflict in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization," the Court opted for limiting
minority workers to the existing employment discrimination remedies, on the basis that those remedies are adequate, and that a
contrary result would prove unnecessarily disruptive of the collective bargaining process. The Court rejected the District of Columbia
Circuit's view that employees' protest activities against racial discrimination were entitled to unique status under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and Title VII. Unless the National Labor
Relations Board was to find that the union was actually remedying
the discrimination to the fullest extent possible by the most expeditious and efficacious means, the court would have found employees
engaged in such activity were protected from discharge by section 7
of the NLRA.' 3
One member of the appellate court, Judge Wyzanski, dissented
because it was clear to him that, given the clear conflict of interest
between the interests of the union's white majority and the black
minority, the union could not meet the high standard of representation set by the court majority." Judge Wyzanski saw this situation
as only superficially analogous to labor decisions where a minority
within an appropriate bargaining unit seeks, without consent of the
representative selected by the majority, to obtain different wages or
a different agreement.
10. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Glover v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969). See also Local 12, United Rubber Workers
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
11. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
12. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
13. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975).
14. Id. at 932 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
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Suggesting that the failure to construe the NLRA as permitting
minorities to bargain for themselves on issues of racial discrimination might raise issues as to the constitutionality of the NLRA,
Judge Wyzanski cut through legal presumptions of what should
happen in union representation to reach what, in so many cases, is
what actually happens. "When," he explained, "the minority consists of non-whites who seek for themselves what they regard as
equality of opportunity, it is to be expected that the position is, if
not hostile to, or at least uncongenial to, certainly not fully shared
by, a majority of whites in the same unit."' 5 Judge Wyzanski was
willing to assume that whites might be tolerant, or even generous,
but that their short-term interests would not be well served by the
affirmative action policies sought by the non-whites. He concluded
that "it is essentially a denial of justice to allow the white majority
to have the power to preclude the non-whites from dealing directly
with the employer on racial issues, whether or not this is in disparagement of the rights of the union representative."' 6
The implications of Judge Wyzanski's statement are much
broader than perhaps he intended. He recognizes the limitations,
based on majority self-interest, imposed on the expression of minority concerns in the collective bargaining process. But similar restraints are present and functioning whenever real relief for minority workers in the job market would require more than nominal
sacrifice of majority interests-deemed valid because so long enjoyed. The failure of courts to follow their own logic in the testing
and seniority cases when presented with the bar exam and layoff
cases illustrate that what Professor Fiss sees as the limited strategy
adopted by society for remedying employment discrimination may,
in fact, prove of little value to minorities in other than those most
blatant situations where the community conscience will not permit
a particular form of racial exploitation to continue, at least not in
its most unabashed form.
Minority workers' understanding that meaningful gains in their
economic status will not likely be obtained without resort to pressures and protests aimed specifically at that goal is not rendered less
accurate because the courts generally have refused, as in the
Emporium case, to recognize self-help rights. 7 The challenge for
those concerned about equal employment is to recognize the inadequacies in existing remedies, acknowledge the serious barriers to
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 938.
Id. at 938-39.
See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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strengthening these remedies, and design techniques for better protecting those workers who are committed to effecting their own
emancipation from the still-pervasive job servitude rooted in the
continuing impact of past discriminatory policies.
Self-representation is a critical key to self-help efforts. The black
workers in the Emporium case phrased it well:
To leave non-whites at the mercy of whites in the presentation of
non-white claims which are admittedly adverse to the whites
would be a mockery of democracy. Suppression, intentional or
otherwise, of the presentation of non-white claims cannot be tolerated in our society even if, which is probably at least the shortterm consequence, the result is that industrial peace is temporarily
adversely affected. In presenting non-white issues non-whites cannot, against their will, be relegated to white spokesmen, mimicking
black men. The day of the minstrel show is over.'"
18.

485 F.2d at 940.

